Judgment -- Vacation Because of Surprise or Excusable Neglect by Montgomery, John R., Jr.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 31 | Number 3 Article 11
4-1-1953
Judgment -- Vacation Because of Surprise or
Excusable Neglect
John R. Montgomery Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
John R. Montgomery Jr., Judgment -- Vacation Because of Surprise or Excusable Neglect, 31 N.C. L. Rev. 324 (1953).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol31/iss3/11
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
refinements ,3 the distinction is illogical;81 .and the clauses are not
readily distinguishable.82
The Hammer case falls within the majority rule both as regards
injury contrasted with disease, and as to the distinction placed on the
term accidental means. The court there held heat exhaustion to be
an injury rather than a disease,3 3 and found the accidental means in the
rays of the sun rather than in the heat exhaustion itself.
Disregarding any possible social justification, it is submitted that, in
view of the freedom of the parties to contract as they will, and the un-
ambiguous language of the policies, the rules adopted by the majority
decisions are those most consonant with settled legal principles.
HAL W. BROADFOOT
Judgment-Vacation Because of Surprise or Excusable Neglect
G. S. 1-220 provides, in part, that:
"The judge shall, upon such terms as may be just, at any time
within one year after notice thereof, relieve a party from a judgment,
order, verdict or other proceeding taken against him through his mis-
take, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect...."
In 1883, Justice Ashe noted the great number of appeals based on
the above statute, commenting, "... and still they come."' The state-
ment is appropriate at the present time.2 As the appeals are "still
coming," a brief recapitulation of cases in which the statute is involved
seems to be in order.
The relief provided by the terms of G. S. 1-220 must be sought by
a motion in the cause and cannot be had in an independent action.8
20 Burr v. Commercial Travelers' Mut. Acc. Ass'n., 295 N. Y. 294, 301, 67
N. E. 2d 248, 251 (1946) ("Our guide must be the reasonable expectation and
purpose of the ordinary business man when making an insurance contract. .. ").
(" Murphy v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 141 Neb. 41, 48, 2 N. W. 2d 576, 580 (1942)
" . . the distinction between accidental result and accidental means cannot be
said to exist.").
"2 Comfort v. Continental Casualty Co., 239 Iowa 1206, 34 N. W. 2d 588(1948) ; Miser v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n., 223 Iowa 662, 273 N. W.
155 (1937) ; Lickleider v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n., 184 Iowa 423, 429,
166 N. W. 363, 366 (1918) (".... the meaning of these words in law differs in
no essential respect from the meaning attributed to them in popular speech.").
" The bulk of American authorities refuse to apply a pathological definition
to the term, "sunstroke," holding instead that same is an accident within the
meaning of an insurance policy. Lower v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 111 N. J. L.
426, 168 Atl. 592 (1933); Continental Casualty Co. v. Clark, 70 Okla. 187, 173
P. 453 (1918); Richards v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 58 Utah 622, 200 P. 1017
(1921); 1 APPLEMAN, INSuRAN E: LAW AND PRAcricE § 447 (1941). Contra:
Dozier v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 46 Fed. 446 (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1891).
'Kivett v. Wynne, 89 N. C. 39, 41 (1883).
20 Over 175 cases involving relief sought under the statute have been decided
since 1883. an average of more than two cases per year.
'Ins. Co. v. Scott, 136 N. C. 157, 48 S. E. 581 (1904) ; Walker v. Gurley, 83
N. C. 429 (1880).
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The statute applies only to judgments which are in all respects regular
and according to the course and practice of the court,4 and therefore has
no application to irregular judgments. 5 Nor does it apply to judg-
ments rendered during the term at which the motion is made. 6 The
statute is applicable whether the judgment is by default or based upon
a verdict. 7 The motion to set aside has been entertained by justices of
the peace s county courts, 9 and recorders' courts, 10 as well as by the
superior courts. 1 A judge cannot hear a motion under the statute out-
side the county in which the judgment or order sought to be set aside was
rendered, except by consent of the parties.12 However, where the judge
in the county of hearing finds as a fact that the case was continued by
consent to be heard out of the original county, this finding is conclusive
on appeal.13
There are three conditions precedent to relief under the statute :14
(1) a showing of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, 5
(2) a showing of a meritorious defense and (3) a motion to set aside,
'Gough v. Bell, 180 N. C. 268, 104 S. E. 535 (1920).
'Hood v. Stewart, 209 N. C. 424, 184 S. E. 36 (1936) ; Cox v. Boyden, 167
N. C. 320, 83 S. E. 246 (1914) ; Massie v. Hainey, 165 N. C. 174, 81 S. E. 135(1914) ; Becton v. Dunn, 137 N. C. 559, 50 S. E. 289 (1905). Neglect beforejudgment does not necessarily bar the right to have an irregular judgment vacated
on motion. Snow Hill Livestock Co. v. Atkinson, 189 N. C. 250, 126 S. E. 610
(1925).
Gold v. Maxwell, 172 N. C. 149, 90 S. E. 115 (1916) ; McCullock v. Doak,
68 N. C. 267 (1873) (Orders and judgments are in fieri during the term and
subject to control of the judge).
'Formerly it was held that the statute had no application to judgments
such as necessarily followed a verdict. Brown v. Rhlinehart, 112 N. C. 772, 16
S. E. 840 (1893). This was changed by PumB.ic LAws oF 1893, ch. 81, which
inserted the word "verdict" in the statute. Now, both the verdict and judg-
ment may be vacated for excusable neglect. Gosnell v. Hilliard, 205 N. C. 297,
171 S. E. 52 (1933).
8 Finlayson v. Accident Co., 109 N. C. 196, 13 S. E. 739 (1891).9 Radeker v. Royal Pines Park, Inc., 207 N. C. 209, 176 S. E. 285 (1934);
Pepper v. Clegg, 132 N. C. 312, 43 S. E. 906 (1903).
'o Taylor v. Gentry, 192 N. C. 503, 135 S. E. 327 (1926).
"' The Clerk of the Superior Court has power under G. S. 1-220 to set asidejudgments rendered by him and appeal may be had to the judge. The judge has
concurrent power with the clerk on motions to set aside judgments rendered by
the clerk. Moody v. Howell, 229 N. C. 198, 49 S. E. 2d 233 (1948).
" Cahoon v. Brinkley, 176 N. C. 5, 96 S. E. 650 (1918) ; Godwin v. Monds, 101
N. C. 354, 7 S. E. 793 (1888); McNeil v. Hodges, 99 N. C. 248, 6 S. E. 127
(1888).
" Gaster v. Thomas, 188 N. C. 346, 124 S. E. 609 (1924) (The finding must be
supported by competent evidence).
,' Fellos v. Allen, 202 N. C. 375, 162 S. E. 905 (1932).
12 Although the statute specifies four distinct grounds for relief, the bulk of
the cases has been concerned with "excusable neglect." The scope of this note
is limited to cases of surprise and excusable neglect under the statute. For cases
involving "mistake" see Rierson v. York. 227 N. C. 575, 42 S. E. 2d 902 (1947):
Crissman v. Palmer. 225 N. C. 472, 35 S. E. 2d 422 (1945) ; Earle v. Earle. 198
N. C. 411, 151 S. E. 884 (1930): Lerch v. Mckinne, 187 N. C. 419, 122 S. E.
9 (1924) ; Mann v. Hall. 163 N. C. 50. 79 S. E. 437 (1913) ; Phifer v. Travellers
Tnq. Co.. 123 N. C. 405, 31 S. E. 715 (1898): Skinner v. Terry, 107 N. C. 103, 12
S. E. 118 (1890) ; Churchill v. Brooklyn Life Ins. Co., 88 N. C. 205 (1883).
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made within one year after notice of the judgment, order, verdict or
other proceeding.
Though relief under the statute is sought most frequently by de-
fendants,1 plaintiffs have on occasion utilized the terms of the section in
seeking to vacate a judgment on a counterclaim,' 7 a judgment of non-
suit,1s or a judgment based upon a verdict.19 The conditions precedent
are the same for a plaintiff as for a defendant except that, instead of
showing a meritorious defense to the cause of action, a plaintiff must
show a meritorious cause of action,2 0 or in case of a counterclaim, a
meritorious defense to the counterclaim.21
Surprise
The "surprise" contemplated by the statute is not surprise at some
action taken by the court,22 but where an attorney withdraws from a case
without notice to his client, the action of the attorney constitutes sur-
prise to the client within the meaning of the statute.2 The burden is on
the party seeking to set aside the judgment to show lack of notice of the
attorney's withdrawal,24 and a meritorious defense must be shown.2 5
Withdrawal of the attorney does not always amount to surprise. Thus,
where the party is present and is notified in open court by the judge that
he must obtain other counsel before the next term of court, there is no
surprise2 6
Excusable neglect
Since each case involving an attempt to set aside a judgment, order,
verdict or other proceeding by reason of excusable neglect is deter-
mined by its particular circumstances, 27 the distinction between cases
of excusable neglect and inexcusable neglect is difficult to enounce.
The court has formulated two basic propositions: A warning that,
"When a man has a case in court, the best thing he an do is to attend
to it,"28 and a standard that, "The least that can be expected of a
1" Generally, where no answer is filed or if an answer is filed, where no appear-
ance is made by defendant or his attorney.
1 Dillingham v. Blue Ridge Motors, 234 N. C. 171, 66 S. E. 2d 641 (1951);
Bradford v. Coit, 77 N. C. 72 (1877).
" Stith v. Jones, 119 N. C. 428, 25 S. E. 1022 (1896).
" Graver v. Spaugh, 226 N. C. 450, 38 S. E. 2d 525 (1946) ; McLeod v. Gooch,
162 N. C. 122, 78 S. E. 4 (1913).
20 Turner v. Southeastern Grain and Livestock Co., 190 N. C. 331, 129 S. E.
725 (1925).
" Dillingham v. Blue Ridge Motors, 234 N. C. 171, 66 S. E. 2d 641 (1951).2 Crissman v. Palmer, 225 N. C. 472, 35 S. E. 2d 422 (1945).
"1 Perkins v. Sykes. 233 N. C. 147, 63 S. E. 2d 133 (1950) : Roediger v. Sapos,
217 N. C. 95, 6 S. E. 2d 801 (1939); Gosnell v. Hilliard, 205 N. C. 297, 171
S. E. 52 (1933).
24 Roediger v. Sapos, 217 N. C. 95, 6 S. E. 2d 801 (1939).22Ibid.
20 Baer v. McCall, 212 N. C. 389, 193 S. E. 406 (1937).
27 Gaylord v. Berry, 169 N. C. 733, 86 S. E. 623 (1915) ; Henry v. Clayton, 85
N. C. 372 (1881).2
"Pepper v. Clegg, 132 N. C. 312, 316, 43 S. E. 906, 907 (1903).
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person having a suit in Court is that he shall give it that amount of
attention which a man of ordinary prudence usually gives to his im-
portant business. '29  In order to determine what a "man of ordinary
prudence" does when he is involved in a lawsuit, resort must be had
to specific cases.3 o
(1) Physical condition of nwvant
Mere forgetfulness of the party in default is not a sufficient ground
for setting aside a judgment,3 1 even where the party is old and feeble, 2
or where he is a physician whose time has been subjected to heavy
wartime demands. 3 3 Sickness in and of itself is an insufficient ground, 4
as is physical fatigue brought about by business worries and large
business interests.3 5  The court apparently considers as sufficient
grounds physical condition such as would render the party non comPos
mentis"' or at least legally unfit to attend to business.3 7
(2) Neglect of service
A party must not ignore service. If he thinks he has been served by
mistake, he must ascertain whether or not he is the proper party. Fail-
ure to do so constitutes inexcusable neglect.3 8  Inaction due to a mis-
taken belief that the summons is "some notice or paper" in a suit al-
ready pending between the same parties will not be excused.3 9 The
result is the same where the party served mistakenly believes that a com-
plaint must be served on him before any action can be taken in the
case.
40
(3) Employnent of attorney
Since a party generally directs his interest in a proceeding through
an attorney, he should employ or at least consult counsel as to his case.41
.Sluder v. Rollins, 76 N. C. 271, 272 (1877).11 Henceforth, in the discussion of neglect, it is assumed that in all cases
there has been some default in the legal proceeding due to the neglect of the party
moving under G.S. 1-220, or his attorney.
31 McDowell v. Justice, 167 N. C. 493, 83 S. E. 803 (1914) (defendant called
at office of clerk several times, asking for the complaint in the case of "J. J.
Bailey v. Justice." There was no such case.).
"Pierce v. Eller, 167 N. C. 672, 83 S. E. 758 (1914) (Defendants were
approximately 76 years of age, feeble and "hard of hearing").
" Johnson v. Sidbury, 225 N. C. 208, 34 S. E. 2d 67 (1945).
*' Jernigan v. Jernigan, 179 N. C. 237, 102 S. E. 310 (1920).
"Hales-Bryant Lumber Co. v. Blue, 170 N. C. 1, 86 S. E. 724 (1915) (defend-
ant's affidavits, made by doctors, tended to show that defendant had been in such
physical condition as to neglect business matters; while plaintiff's affidavits tended
to show that defendant was director of two banks, a good business man, and
capable of looking after his own affairs).
" Pierce v. Eller, 167 N. C. 672, 83 S. E. 758 (1914).
"7 Hales-Bryant Lumber Co. v. Blue, 170 N. C. 1, 86 S. E. 724 (1915).
3" Depriest v. Patterson, 85 N. C. 376 (1881).
"' Johnson v. Sidbury, 225 N. C. 208, 34 S. E. 2d 67 (1945) ; White v. Snow,
71 N. C. 232 (1874).
," Churchill v. Brooklyn Life Ins. Co., 88 N. C. 205 (1883).
" Holland v. Edgecombe Benevolent Ass'n., 176 N. C. 86, 97 S. E. 150 (1918);
Churchill v. Brooklyn Life Ins. Co., 88 N. C. 205 (1883).
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He is not giving his case the proper care when he simply writes letters
of inquiry as to the extent of the claim against him, deriving no
definite information from replies to the letters.42 Where a party's at-
tention to the litigation consists of writing to an attorney to request that
he handle the case, after which he makes no further inquiry, his neglect
is inexcusable.43 The same result follows where the litigant merely
"speaks to" an attorney without more.44 Even when an attorney is re-
tained, if the em'ployment takes place so late that the attorney cannot
appear before judgment, the neglect of the party is inexcusable.4 5
A litigant may not abandon his case simply because he employs
counsel, 46 for the employment in and of itself is insufficient to constitute
excusable neglect.47 He must apprise the attorney of facts constituting
his defense to the action.48  He must be available in order to appear
at the trial,49 and may not willfully absent himself intending not to
appear unless he is notified to do so by his attorney. 0 However, if
the party leaves the court or remains away on the advice of his at-
torney that it is "needless for him to go,"' 1 that "nothing more will be
done" during the term, 52 that he is "no longer required"58 or that he
"need not concern himself until he is further advised,"8 4 his neglect is
excusable. When a party does appear in court, he must take notice of
what occurs there. 55
Formerly, the cases held that neglect of a party was inexcusable
unless he employed an attorney who ordinarily practiced in the court
where the action was instituted or one who especially engaged to go
there.5" If the party employed a non-local attorney, he had to see that
,2 Governor ex rel. Trustees of University of North Carolina v. Lassiter, 83
N. C. 38 (1880).
'Burke v. Stokely, 65 N. C. 569 (1871).
"Simonton v. Lanier, 71 N. C. 498 (1874).
'Finlayson v. The American Accident Co., 109 N. C. 196, 13 S. E. 739
(1891).
4Seawell v. Parsons Lumber Co., 172 N. C. 320, 90 S. E. 241 (1916) ; Mc-
Leod v. Gooch, 162 N. C. 122, 78 S. E. 4 (1913) ; Pepper v. Clegg, 132 N. C. 312,
43 S. E. 906 (1903) ; Roberts v. Allman, 106 N. C. 391, 11 S. E. 424 (1890).
47 Hyde County Land & Lumber Co. v. Thomasville Chair Co., 190 N. C. 437,
130 S. E. 12 (1925) ; Boing v. Raleigh & Gaston R. R. Co., 88 N. C. 62 (1883).
"' Gaylord v. Berry, 169 N. C. 733, 86 S. E. 623 (1915) ; Cowles v. Cowles, 121
N. C. 272, 28 8. E. 476 (1897).
"Henry v. Clayton, 85 N. C. 372 (1881); Sluder v. Rollins, 76 N. C. 271
(1877).
"0 Cobb v. O'Hagan, 81 N. C. 293 (1879) ; Bradford v. Coit, 77 N. C. 72 (1877).
"Ellington v. Wicker, 87 N. C. 14 (1882).
" English v. English, 87 N. C. 497 (1882).
"
3 Pickens v. Fox, 90 N. C. 369 (1884).
" Meece v. Commercial Credit Co., 201 N. C. 139, 159 S. E. 17 (1931);
Edwards v. Butler, 186 N. C. 200, 119 S. E. 7 (1923).
"2 Carter v. Anderson, 208 N. C. 529, 181 S. E. 750 (1935) (Party was in
court with counsel when continuance was denied. Both left without any definite
agreement with adversary party or with the court, and failed to appear at the
trial).
"Hyde County Land & Lumber Co. v. Thomasville Chair Co., 190 N. C. 437,
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the non-local attorney attended court and "stayed on guard for him."5 7
In Helderman v. Mills Co.,58 the court abrogated the requirement of
employment of local counsel and indicated that a party could safely rely
on a non-local attorney of high character and professional standing.59
The present requirement seems to be that the party must (1) employ
reputable, skilled and competent counsel and (2) impart to counsel facts
constituting his defense.60
Where the defaulting party is chargeable with notice that his at-
torney will be unable to conduct his case, inaction will amount to in-
excusable neglect. The party may be chargeable with notice that his
attorney has died,61 left the state,62 joined the army,63 or is too ill to
handle the litigation.64
(4) Effect of negotiations and deception
Where the parties, or their attorneys, have engaged in negotiations,
contemplating a settlement of the action, or the defaulting party has
been reasonably misled by some statement of the other party or his
attorney, neglect of the action may be excusable. Where a settlement
was pending and it is shown that, except for excusable delay in noti-
fying the adversary party of any acceptance of the proposed settlement,
a judgment would not have resulted, a motion to set aside may be
granted.6 5 The motion may not be granted however, where an offer of
settlement has been expressly withdrawn. 66 The result is the same
where the defaulting party is notified that judgment will be taken
130 S. E. 12 (1925) ; Ham v. Person, 173 N. C. 72, 91 S. E. 605 (1917) ; McKeel
Hardware Co. v. Buhmann, 159 N. C. 511, 75 S. E. 731 (1912); Stockton v.
Wolverine Gold Mining Co., 144 N. C. 595, 57 S. E. 335 (1907) ; Osborn v. Leach,
133 N. C. 428, 45 S. E. 783 (1903); Pepper v. Clegg, 132 N. C. 312, 43 S. E.
906 (1903); Manning v. Roanoke and Tar 'River R. R. Co., 122 N. C. 824, 28
S. E. 963 (1898).
McLeod v. Gooch, 162 N. C. 122, 78 S. E. 4 (1913).
'192 N. C. 626, 135 S. E. 627 (1926).
' Ibid.
00 Sutherland v. McLean, 199 N. C. 345, 154 S. E. 662 (1930).
01 Queen v. Gloucester Lumber Co., 170 N. C. 501, 87 S. E. 325 (1915) (At-
torney retired and died seven months before judgment was rendered. Party
did not employ other counsel until service of execution under the judgment);
Simpson v. Brown, 117 N. C. 482, 23 S. E. 441 (1895); Kivett v. Wynne, 89
N. C. 39 (1883) (Attorney died three weeks prior to trial. He was a public
figure; his death received much notoriety. Party did not employ other counsel,
nor did he appear at the trial).
2 Cahoon v. Brinkley, 176 N. C. 5, 96 S. E. 650 (1918) (Attorney ceased con-
nection with case and moved to Colorado, intending to reside there permanently).
" Jones-Onslow Land Co. v. Wooten, 177 N. C. 248, 98 S. E. 706 (1919) (De-
fendant paid no attention to case when attorney had left the county to join the
army two months before judgment).
' Holland v. Edgecombe Benevolent Ass'n, 176 N. C. 86, 97 S. E. 150 (1918)
(Attorney confined to hospital under the care of the party. Party made no inquiry
as to the state of the action).
° Cagle v. Williamson, 200 N. C. 727, 158 S. E. 391 (1931) (Neglect in noti-
fication, if any, was that of attorney and not that of party).
"6 Gray v. King, 180 N. C. 667, 104 S. E. 646 (1920).
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unless an answer is filed,6 7 or unless payment, upon terms previously
agreed on, is made. 8
The defaulting party cannot safely rely on the advice of a neigh-
bor,69 or upon the promise of the adversary party that judgment will
not be taken, where the promise is not filed or brought to the attention
of the court.70 However, if the party is reasonably misled by his ad-
versary's attorney, his resulting neglect might be held to be excusable.7
1
But the reliance must be reasonable. For example, where plaintiff's at-
torney merely informs defendant that the plaintiff has an incontestable
cause of action, the judgment will not be set aside.72 Also, the default-
ing party must be diligent."3 If the defendant is reasonably misled, it is
immaterial whether or not the misleading is intentional. 4
(5) Neglect of agent
In General: As a general rule, in cases of simple agency, the in-
excusable neglect of an agent is imputable to a principal moving to
set aside.75  The agent may be the movant's grantor,"7 co-defendant,77
business manager 8 general agent, 9 local agent,80 surety8' or insurance
carrier.8 2  However, the agent's neglect will not be imputed to the
principal unless the agent is a "responsible agent."83  A distinction is
made between agents of a foreign corporation who are such because of
a contractual relationship and those who are merely process agents due
to operation of law. The court will not hold as a matter of law that
the neglect of the latter is imputable to the corporation.8 4
" Union Guano Co. v. Middlesex Supply Co., 181 N. C. 210, 106 S. E. 832
(1921).
68 Perkins v. Sharp, 191 N. C. 224, 131 S. E. 584 (1926).
Mauney v. Gidney, 88 N. C. 200 (1883) (The neighbor stated that he had
consulted counsel and that no defense was available to defendant).
10 LeDuc v. Slocomb, 124 N. C. 347, 32 S. E. 726 (1899).
'Union Guano Co. v. Hearne, 172 N. C. 398, 90 S. E. 420 (1916) (Where
plaintiff's attorney intimated that judgment would be sought against defendants'
separate balances on a single contract, when, in fact, the action was instituted
against defendants jointly, charging them with fraudulent misapplication).1 Mauney v. Gidney, 88 N. C. 200 (1883).
Kerchner v. Baker, 82 N. C. 169 (1880) (plaintiff's attorney agreed iwth
defendant's attorney that no action would be taken without notice to defendant
or his attorney, but plaintiff's attorney died and plaintiff recovered judgment.
Defendant never made any inquiry concerning the action).
' Union Guano Co. v. Hearne, 172 N. C. 398, 90 S. E. 420 (1916) (The earlier
case of Mauney v. Gidney, 88 N. C. 200 (1883) apparently made artifice by the
plaintiff an essential ingredient).
"'Morris v. Liverpool Ins. Co., 131 N. C. 212, 42 S. E. 577 (1902); Finlayson
v. The Amercian Accident Co., 109 N. C. 196, 13 S. E. 739 (1891).
"8 Norwood v. King, 86 N. C. 80 (1882).
7 Bank of Statesville v. Foote, 77 N. C. 131 (1877).
"8 Pate v. Pittman Hospital, 234 N. C. 637, 68 S. E. 2d 288 (1951).
Stallings v. Spruill, 176 N. C. 121, 96 S. E. 890 (1918).
Hershey Corp. v. Atlantic Coastline R. P. Co., 203 N. C. 184, 165 S. E. 550
(1932).81Elramy v. Abeyounis, 189 N. C. 278, 126 S. E. 743 (1925).
2 Stephens v. Childers, 236 N. C. 348, 72 S. E. 2d 849 (1952).
" Pate v. Pittman Hospital, 234 N. C. 637, 68 S. E. 2d 288 (1951).
", Townsend v. Carolina Coach Co., 231 N. C. 81, 56 S. E. 2d 39 (1949) (The
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Attorney-Client: Ordinarily, a client is not charged with the in-
excusable neglect of his attorney, provided the client himself has ex-
ercised proper care.85 However, where an attorney is not performing
his professional duties, but is doing some act that the client can and
should perform, then the attorney is a mere agent of the client and his
neglect is imputable.8 6 Thus, where the client employs counsel, not to
appear in the case, but merely to select counsel who will appear, neglect
of the first attorney in failing to employ counsel is imputable to the
client.8 7 But if the "selecting" attorney reasonably believes that he
has employed counsel and repeatedly assures the client that he has, his
neglect is not imputable to the client. 8
Husband-wife: Where a husband is acting as agent for his wife
in handling her interest in litigation, his neglect is not imputable to her,8 9
whether the action is against husband and wife jointly,0 or against the
wife alone.' 1 In legal contemplation, the wife is inclined to trust her
interest in an adversary suit to her husband and failure of the husband
to employ counsel and attend to the suit is deemed to make her conse-
quent failure to defend a case of excusable neglect.
9 2
Meritorious defense
In order to set aside under G. S. 1-220 a party must show both
excusable neglect and a meritorious defense, 3 for the court has said
"agent' here had no contractual relationship with the defaulting defendant. She
was an employee of lessees of a bus station and merely sold tickets for the de-
fendant, therefore she came within the definition of a "person receiving money"
under N. C. G . STAT. § 1-97 (1) (1943), making her defendant's agent for
service of process. The court held that she was not the type agent whose neglect
is imputable to defendant for purposes of G. S. 1-220. The court uses language
that seems to indicate a liberal attitude toward defendants seeking to set aside in
circumstances such as appeared in this case. ". . . no officer or agent, charged
with the dity of defending actions against the corporation (italics added) knew of
the existence of the suit until after judgment had been taken." Townsend v. Caro-
lina Coach Co. supra at p. 84, 56 S. E. 2d at p. 41).
" Rierson v. York, 227 N. C. 575. 42 S. E. 2d 902 (1947) ; Meece v. Com-
mercial Credit Co., 201 N. C. 139, 159 S. E. 17 (1931)'; Helderman v. Hartsell
Mills Co., 192 N. C. 626, 135 S. E. 627 (1926) ; Grandy v. Products Co., 175
N. C. 511, 95 S. E. 914 (1918) ; Schiele v. North State Fire Ins. Co., 171 N. C.
426. 88 S. E. 764 (1916) ; Griel v. Vernon, 65 N. C. 76 (1871).
"' Seawell v. Parsons Lumber Co., 172 N. C. 320, 90 S.. E. 241 (1916).
" Kerr v. Joint Stock Bank, 205 N. C. 410, 171 S. E. 367 (1933) ; Pailin v.
Cedar Works, 193 N. C. 256, 136 S. E. 635 (1927) ; Manning v. Roanoke and
Tar River R. R., 122 N. C. 824, 28 S. E. 963 (1898). This situation frequently
arises where a business firm employs a general counsel whose duties include as-
signing litigation to attorneys at the location of the action.
18 Seawell v. Parsons Lumber Co., 172 N. C. 320, 90 S. E. 241 (1927). For
a discussion of the rule of non-imputation of attorney's neglect to client, see 26
N. C. L. Rxv. 84 (1947).
09 Nicholson v. Cox, 83 N. C. 48 (1880).
" Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Turner, 202 N. C. 162, 162 S. E. 221
(1931); Morris Plan Industrial Bank v. Turner, 202 N. C. 165, 162 S. E. 222
(1931); Farmers Nat. Bank and Trust Co. v. Turner, 202 N. C. 166, 162 S. E.
223 (1931).
" Sikes v. Weatherly, 110 N. C. 131, 14 S. E. 511 (1892).
".Nicholson v. Cox, 83 N. C. 48 (1880).
"
9Hanford v. McSwain, 230 N. C. 229, 53 S. E. 2d 84 (1949); Garrett v.
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that "It would be idle to vacate a judgment where there is no real or
substantial defense on the merits. ' 94 Of course, in the absence of a
showing of excusable neglect, any question of meritorious defense be-
comes immaterial. 5 Some examples of meritorious defense are re-
lease,96 want of service,07 denial of plaintiff's title or title in defendant
by adverse possession98 and breach of the contract sued upon. 9 Also,
an allegation of actual notice to plaintiff of the retirement of defendant
from a partnership prior to an extension of credit by the plaintiff to the
partnership is considered a sufficient averment of a meritorious de-
fense. 10 0 However, a technical defense, such as the statute of limita-
tions, is not meritorious. 10 1 As a general rule, a meritorious defense
is one that goes to the intrinsic merit of the case and is founded in good
conscience.' 02
Time of motion
A party seeking relief under G. S. 1-220 must present his motion
within one year. 0 3 The statute does not apply to cases where service
is by publication. 04 Therefore, since a party who is personally served
or who is in court by voluntary appearance has notice of all that occurs
in court,10 5 the one year period runs from the date of the rendition of the
judgment. By this is meant the actual date of rendition and not the first
day of the term during which the judgment was rendered.10
Procedure on the motion
A party seeking to set aside a judgment under G. S. 1-220 must
file affidavits, along with an application to set aside the judgment, with
the court. Notice of motion is given to the adversary party, who may
submit counter-affidavits. The court then hears the motion on the affi-
Trent, 216 N. C. 162, 4 S. E. 2d 319 (1939) ; Woody v. Privett, 199 N. C. 378,
154 S. E. 625 (1930); Battle v. Mercer, 187 N. C. 437, 122 S. E. 4 (1924);
Crumpler v. Hines, 174 N. C. 283, 93 S. E. 780 (1917); Minton v. Hughes, 158
N. C. 587, 73 S. E. 810 (1912) ; Bank of Statesville v. Foote, 77 N. C. 131 (1877).
" Cayton v. Clark, 212 N. C. 374, 375, 193 S. E. 404 (1937).
:'Stephens v. Childers, 236 N. C. 348, 72 S. E. 2d 849 (1952).
'Sircey v. Hans Rees' Sons, 155 W. C. 296, 71 S. E. 310 (1911).
" Monroe v. Niven, 221 N. . 362, 20 S. E. 2d 311 (1942).
"
8Duffer v. Brunson, 188 N. C. 789, 125 S. E. 619 (1924).
"
0 Everett v. Johnson, 219 N. C. 540, 14 S. E. 2d 250 (1941).
... Hanford v. McSwain, 230 N. C. 229, 53 S. E. 2d 84 (1949). See notes
111-114 infra for further indications as to what constitutes a meritorious defense.
"'
1Wyche v. Ross, 119 N. C. 174, 25 S. E. 878 (1896).
0 1 FREEMAN, LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 286 (5th ed. 1925).
.0. Gordon v. Pintsch Gas Co., 178 N. C. 435, 100 S. E. 878 (1919); Currie
v. Golconda Mining and Milling Co., 157 N. C. 209, 72 S. E. 980 (1911); In-
surance Co. v. Scott, 136 N. C. 157, 48 S. E. 581 (1904).
... Foster v. Allison Corp.. 191 N. C. 166, 131 S. E. 648 (1926).
. Roberts v. Allman, 106 N. C. 391, 11 S. E. 424 (1890) ; McLean v. McLean,
84 N. C. 365 (1881).
... Jernigan v. Jernigan, 178 N. C. 84, 100 S. E. 184 (1919). (The rule of
judgments "relating back" to the first day of the term is not applicable.)
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davits.10 7  The circumstances alleged as constituting surprise, mistake,
inadvertence or excusable neglect must of necessity be set forth in the
affidavits as they will not appear in any other records of the case.
(1) Showing a ineritorious defense
In the absence of an answer, a meritorious defense must be alleged
by affidavits.10 8 The allegations in the affidavit must be definite.10 9
Facts, not conclusions of law, must be alleged. °10 Where a verified
answer denying the material allegations of the complaint is filed and is
a part of the record, it may be sufficient to show a meritorious defense."'
If the plaintiff is the movant, his complaint may be sufficient to show a
meritorious defense to a counterclaim."12 Where a case goes on to trial,
after the former judgment has been set aside on motion, and the de-
fendant wins the case, this is held to be ". . a very fair test of good
defense."" 3 Other records on which a finding of meritorious defense
may be established are a judgment of the case on a former trial and
an opinion of the Supreme Court on a former appeal.114
It is only necessary to allege facts constituting a meritorious defense
or a meritorious cause of action. The facts alleged do not have to be
conclusive, but they must show a prima facie defense or cause of ac-
tion."x5 The judge does not -determine the truth or falsity of the de-
fense," 6 thus there may be a sufficient allegation of meritorious defense
even though, in fact, there is no defense.17
(2) Findings of fact and conclusions
The court hearing the motion should find the facts as to surprise or
excusable neglect and as to the matter of a meritorious defense or cause
of action. However, the judge is not required to find facts, in the ab-
107 McIntosh, Noam CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 655 (1929).
... Fellos v. Allen, 202 N. C. 375, 162 S. E. 905 (1932). Sutherland v. McLean,
199 N. C. 345, 154 S. E. 662 (1930).
o' Montague v. Lumpkins, 178 N. C. 270, 100 S. E. 417 (1919).
110 Hooks v. Neighbors, 211 N. C. 382, 190 S. E. 236 (1937).
111 Perkins v. Sykes, 233 N. C. 147, 63 S. E. 2d 133 (1950) ; Cagle v. William-
son, 200 N. C. 727, 158 S. E. 391 (1931); Gallins v. Globe-Rutgers Fire Ins.
Co., 174 N. C. 553, 94 S. E. 300 (1917). See Chosen Confections Inc. v. Johnson,
218 N. C. 500, 11 S. E. 2d 472 (1940), where defense was shown by answer. Al-
though the answer was ordered stricken, it was preserved in the record by an
exception.2 Godwin v. Brickhouse, 220 N. C. 40, 16 S. E. 2d 403 (1941). Cf. Craver
v. Spaugh, 226 N. C. 450, 38 S. E. 2d 525 (1946).
111 Sircey v. Hans Rees' Sons, 155 N. C. 296, 299, 71 S. E. 310, 311 (1911).
114 Perkins v. Sykes, 233 N. C. 147, 63 S. E. 2d 133 (1950).
15 Crumpler v. Hines, 174 N. C. 283, 93 S. E. 780 (1917).
"'
0Gaylord v. Berry, 169 N. C. 733, 86 S. E. 623 (1915).
'" Hanford v. McSwain, 230 N. C. 229, 53 S. E. 2d 84 (1949). But see, Craver
v. Spaugh, 226 N. C. 450, 38 S. E. 2d 525 (1946), where the court said that
although the allegations of a verified complaint may be used as evidence of a
cause of action or defense, the allegations are not conclusive or irrebuttable and
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sence of a request to do so."18 If a request is made, it is error for the
judge to refuse to find facts.1 " Therefore, one of two courses may be
taken. If the judge does not find facts, it will be presumed on review
that he found such facts as would support his ruling.120 If the judge
does find facts, the facts found are conclusive on review,' 21 except in
the following cases: (1) where there is an exception that there is no
evidence to support the facts,1 22 (2) where there is an exception that
the judge failed to find material facts,1 23 (3) where there is an exception
that the judge considered facts not material 24 and (4) where the judge
found facts under a misapprehension of the law or the facts. 2
Upon the facts found, the judge determines whether or not there
is surprise or excusable neglect and a meritorious defense or cause of
action. 2 6  From this, either party may appeal. 27  Unless the judge
concludes correctly that there was both excusable neglect (or surprise)
and a meritorious defense, he is without power to set aside the judg-
ment.1 28  If he concludes that there was both excusable neglect or sur-
prise and a meritorious defense, then he may, in his discretion, set aside
the judgment. 29  This exercise of discretion is not reviewable except
in case of abuse 30 or misapprehension of power to set aside.' 8 '
will not override a finding of the judge made on conflicting testimony that there
is no cause of action or defense.
"'Holcomb v. Holcomb, 192 N. C. 504, 135 S. E. 287 (1926).120 Ibid.
120 Crissman v. Palmer, 225 N. C. 472, 35 S. E. 2d 422 (1945) ; Holcomb v.
Holcomb, 192 N. C. 504, 135 S. E. 287 (1926) ; Gardiner v. May, 172 N. C. 192,
89 S. E. 955 (1916) ; McLeod v. Gooch, 162 N. C. 122, 78 S. E. 4 (1913).
"'
1Gunter v. Dowdy, 224 N. C. 522, 31 S. E. 2d 524 (1944) ; Clayton v. Adams,
206 N. C. 920, 175 S. E. 185 (1934); Crye v. Stoltz, 193 N. C. 802, 138 S. E.
167 (1927); Jones-Onslow Land Co. v. Wooten, 177 N. C. 248, 98 W. E. 706
(1919) ; Beaufort Lumber Co. v. Cottingham, 173 N. C. 323, 92 S. E. 9 (1917) ;
Marion v. Tilley, 119 N. C. 473, 26 S. E. 26 (1896) ; Weil v. Woodard, 104 N. C.
94, 10 S. E. 129 (1889) ; Branch v. Walker, 92 N. C. 91 (1885).
122 Beaufort Lumber Co. v. Cottingham, 173 N. C. 323, 92 S. E. 9 (1917);
Norton v. McLaurin, 125 N. C. 185, 34 S. E. 269 (1899) and cases cited there.22 Beaufort Lumber Co., v. Cottingham, supfra note 122.1 2 Gorman v. Yorke, 214 N. C. 524, 199 S. E. 729 (1938).
.2 Perkins v. Sykes, 233 N. C. 147, 63 S. E. 2d 133 (1950); Hanford v.
McSwain, 230 N. C. 229, 53 S. E. 2d 84 (1949) ; Marsh v. Griffin, 123 N. C. 660,
31 S. E. 840 (1898) ; Where this occurs, the case will be remanded for a proper
finding of facts. Coley v. Dalrymple, 225 N. C. 67, 33 S. E. 2d 477 (1945).
"" Beaufort Lumber Co. v. Cottingham, 173 N. C. 323, 92 S. E. 9 (1917).
'
27Helderman v. Hartsell Mills Co., 192 N. C. 626, 135 S. E. 627 (1926);
Jones-Onslow Land Co. v. Wooten, 177 N. C. 248, 98 S. E. 706 (1919).
.
2
.Jones-Onslow Land Co. v. Wooten, 177 N. C. 248, 98 S. E. 706 (1919);
Stockton v. Wolverine Gold Mining Co.. 144 N. C. 595, 57 S. E. 335 (1907);
Manning v. Roanoke and Tar River R. R., 122 N. C. 824, 28 S. E. 963 (1898);
Stith v. Jones, 119 N. C. 428, 25 S. E. 1022 (1896).
12' Garner v. Quakenbush, 187 N. C. 603. 122 S. E. 474 (1924).
..
0 Wyche v. Ross, 119 N. C. 174, 25 S. E. 878 (1896).
"I1 Crissman v. Palmer, 225 N. C. 472, 35 S. E. 2d 422 (1945) ; Albertson v.
Terry, 108 N. C. 75, 12 S. E. 892 (1891) (The burden is on the movant to show
that the judge is not exercising discretion. The party should request specification
of grounds of decision and assign error).
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(3) Exceptions
In order to insure a complete review of the trial court's action on
motions under G. S. 1-220, the following request and exceptions should
be considered: (1) a request that the trial judge find facts, with an ex-
ception if the request is refused, 32 (2) exceptions to individual findings
of fact,' 33 and (3) exceptions to conclusions of the judge as to surprise
or excusable neglect and meritorious defense.'3 4 Also, the question of
what is presented for review by the following exceptions should be
recognized. A "broadside" exception presents for review only the
question of whether or not the facts found by the judge support his
judgment. 135 A general exception to the findings of fact on which the
judgment of the trial court rests, i.e. "a shot at the covey," will not be
considered on appeal.'80 An exception to the judgment below presents
only two questions: Whether the facts found support the judgment and
whether errors of law appear on the face of the record.
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Trusts-Constructive Trust-Recovery of Proceeds of Wrongful
Disclosure of Confidential Information
Defendant, a geologist, was employed full time by the plaintiff to
secure and classify geological data for use in locating and acquiring oil
properties. The information was highly confidential. Upon discovery
that defendant had been divulging parts of this information to con-
federates, who through its use were able to secure valuable oil interests
for themselves and for defendant, an action was begun to impress a con-
structive trust on the interests thus secured. It was held that de-
fendant had breached his fiduciary duty to his employer in divulging
this information, and it was decreed that defendant and his confederates
held the interests and profits therefrom as constructive trustees for the
plaintiff.'
Defined broadly, a constructive trust is a remedial device used to
compel one who holds property wrongfully acquired or retained to
.
12 McLeod v. Gooch, 162 N. C. 122, 78 S. E. 4 (1913).
.
3 Radeker v. Royal Pines Park, Inc., 207 N. C. 209, 176 S. E. 285 (1934);
Perkins v. Sykes, 233 N. C. 147, 63 S. E. 2d 133 (1950). (Exceptions must be
to individual findings of fact, as a general exception to findings will not be con-
sidered on appeal.) See cases cited supra notes 121-124.
"' Southern Butane Gas Corp. v. Bullard, 232 N. C. 730, 62 S. E. 2d 335
(1950).
" Dillingham v. Blue Ridge Motors, 234 N. C. 171, 66 S. E. 2d 641 (1951).
"~O Perkins v. Sykes, 233 N. C. 147, 63 S. E. 2d 133 (1950).
"' Hanford v. McSwain, 230 N. C. 229, 53 S. E. 2d 84 (1949).
'Hunter v. Shell Oil Company, 198 F. 2d 485 (5th Cir. 1952) ; accord, Pratt
v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 100 F. 2d 833 (9th Cir. 1937), approved in 25 VA. L.
REv. 848 (1939) ; Ohio Oil Company v. Sharpe, 135 F. 2d 303 (5th Cir. 1943)
reversing 45 F. Supp. 969 (D. C. Okla. 1942), approved in 41 MIcE. L. REv.
747 (1943).
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